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l'N THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
BENNETT ASSOCIATION
a Massachusetts business tr~st,
Plaintiff,

-vs. -

)
I,

\

8TATE TAX COMMISSION OF )
UTAH,

Case No.
10682

Defendant.

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT
STATEMENT OF THE GASE
This is an original proceeding to review an order
and decision of the State Tax Commission upholding a
franchise tax deficiency against Bennett Association in
the amount of $73,029.02.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Plaintiff herein, Bennett Association, is a Massachusetts business trust with its principal place of business in Salt Lake City, Utah. At all times mentioned
herein Plaintiff owned more than 95% of the outstanding
stock of Bennett Leasing Company, Utah Auto Rentals
and Bennett's, a Utah corporation.
On or before April 15, 1965, the Plaintiff filed a
eonsolidated corporation franchise tax return for its
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January 1, 19G.f, to DPcember 31, 1%-±, t·ah.•ndar year,
and included tlwn~in the• income of Utah Auto Rentals
and Bennett Leasing Company. Ho\\·ever, it failed to
include the income of Bemwtt 's and did not include a
consent from the latter corporation to the filing of a
consolidated return on its bt>half. Had the return been
filed in a proper and timely fashion, it would have shown
that on .March 31, l!JG.f, Benm·tt 's made a liquidating
distribution of all of its a::.;sets to the BC'nnett Association in accordance with a plan of li(1uidation and dissolution. This liquidating distribution was computed on
the fair market value of asset::.; transf ern·d from Bennett's to the Plaintiff in the amount of $1,7GG,362.80. A
franchise tax deficiency ha::.; bePn ::.;nstained by the State
Tax Commission upon this income to Bennett Association
in the amount of $70,559.-1-±, together with interest thereon in the amount of $2,-±69.58 for a total deficiency of
$73,029.02.
The Commission held that the Plaintiff was not entitled to claim the benefits of filing a consolidated return
with its dissolved ~mbsidiary and rulPd that the liquidating distribution which it received from this subsidiary was taxable to the parent corporation. It is this ruling that Plaintiff asks this court to review.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
ONLY AN AFFILIATED CORPORATION HAVING A
TAXABLE YEAR OF ITS OWN CAN BE ACCORDED THE
PRIVILEGE OF JOINING IN A CONSOLIDATED RETURN
FOR THAT YEAR SO AS TO QUALIFY FOR AN INTERCOMPANY TRANSACTION EXEMPTION.
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As a general 1ule the liquidating dividend paid from
a subsidiary to a parent in the State of Utah is taxable
to the parent. Such a distribution is required to be
included in the gross income of the parent and after
taking into consideration certain adjustments on the
basis of property involved, it is taxable as income to the
parent corporation. See Sec. 59-13-5 UCA 1953.
Amounts distributed in complete liquidation of a
corporation are treated as full payment in exchange
for stock and are taxable to the distributee. See 59-13-14
UCA 1953.
It must be noted that 1964 was not a taxable year
for Bennett's under Sec. 59-13-1 (6), UCA 1953. This
section provides :

"The term 'taxable year' means the calendar year
or the fiscal year ending during such calendar
year upon the basis of which the net income is
computed and includes, in the case of a return
made for a fractional part of a year under the
provisions of this chapter, or under regulations
prescribed by the Tax Commission, the period
for which such return is made ..."
1

The franchise tax in Utah is a tax on the privilege
of doing business measured by income and is a prepaid
tax. Sec. 59-13-3, UCA 1953, provides that every corporation'' for the privilege of exercising its corporate franchise or the privilege of doing business in the state shall
annually pay to this state a tax equal to 4% of its net
income for the preceeding taxable year, computed and
allocated to this state in the manner hereinafter pro-

vided ... " (Emphasis suppled.) Thus, 1964 was not a
taxable year for Benm·tt's even though it may otherwise
be a member of the consolidated group in question.
It should not be allowed to join in a consolidated
return for the year 196-1- because the privilege of making
a consolidated return for any taxable year is only granted
to members of an affiliated group in place of the individual returns which the members of that group would
otherwise be n'quired to file. A corporation which owes
no return cannot participate in the filing of a joint return
or a consolidated return ~with other corporations. And,
as Regulation 4 only begins to operate after the existence
of a consolidated return privilege is established, it seems
clear that a group of corporations not entitled to file a
consolidated return under the statute cannot claim a
consolidated return exemption under isolated portions
of the regulation.

In the year 1964- Bennett's paid to the Bennett
Association a liquidating dividend which is taxable under
Utah law unless an exemption is available to the parent
which would prevent this dividend from being included
in the tax return filed for or by the parent.
The only special tax consideration available is that
provided by Franchise Tax Regulation No. 4, Article
34, which states:
"Gain or loss shall not be recognized upon a distribution during a consolidated return period by
a member of an affiliated group to another mem-
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ber of such group in cancellation or redemption
of stock; and any such distribution shall be con::,;idered an intercompany transaction."
'l'hus, while no statutory exemption is provided, the
Plaintiff herein contends that the distribution which it
received from its subsidiary should be treated as an inkreompany transaction and that it need not report such
a liquidating dividend as income.
A determination of the propriety of this contention
necessarily involves inquiry into the nature of consolidated returns and affiliated groups as defined by Utah
statutes.
Sec. 59-13-2:3, UCA 1953, defines affiliated group in
Utah and under the general definition contained there,
it is p1·obable that Bennett's would be a member of an
affiliated group in 1964 even though it dissolved in
"Thfarch of that year. However, Sec. 59-13-23, UCA 1953,
further provides that an affiliated group shall have the
lJrivilege of making a consolidated return "for arny taxable year in lieu of sepa.rate returns." (Emphasis supplied.) Thus, the statute contemplates the filing of one
consolidated return in place of many separate returns.
These returns would, of course, only be due if the individual corporations had taxable years, the activities of
which they were required to report. The statute, therefore, requires a "taxable year'' for each member of the
affiliated group as a prerequisite for inclusion of that
member's activities in the consolidated return filed for
that taxable year.
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POINT II
THE LIQUIDATING DISTRIBUTION PAID TO PLAIN.
TIFF IS NOT EXEMPT FROM TAXATION UNDER TAX
COMMISSION FRANCHISE TAX REGULATION NO. 4.

The Utah franchise tax act does not provide for
special tax treatment of intercompany transactions reported on consolidated returns. Any exemption applicable to such transactions must be based on the franchise
tax regulations promulgated by the Tax Commission.
The question of whether or not the Commission can
provide by regulation an exemption from income which
is required by statute to be taxed is uncertain, but does
not need to be decided in connection with this appeal.
Section 59-13-23, UCA 1953, provides in part:
"By Affiliated Group.
(1) An affiliated group of banks and/or
other corporation shall, subject to the provisions
of this section, have the privilege of making a
consolidated return for any taxable year in lieu
of separate returns. The making of a consolidated
return shall be 'Upon the condition that all the corporations which have been members of the affiliated group at any time during the taxable year
for which the return is made consent to all the
regulations under subsection (2) of this section
prescribed prior to the making of such return;
and the making of a consolidated return shall be
considered as such consent...
Rules and Regulations.
(2) The Tax Commission shall prescribe such
requlations as it may deem necessary in order that
th~ tax liability of an affiliated group of banks
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and/or corporations 1naking a consolidated return

and of each corporation in the groitp, both during

and after the peri.od of affilation, may be deter1.n i11ed, computed, assessed, collected and adjusted
in such manner as clearly to ref le ct the income .am,.d
to prei:ent avoidance of tax liabilty . .. " (Empha-

sis added.)

Thus, the privilege of filing consolidated returns
is only granted in lieu of making separate returns and
ei:en then it is conditioned upon all corporations involved
consenting to all of the regulations under Subsection (2)
prescribed prior to the making of such return.
Therefore, even if Article 34 of Regulation 4 does
establish an exemption for intercompany transactions
reported on consolidated returns, this exemption cannot
be broader than the regulation upon which it is based.
The privilege of filing a consolidated return is conditioned upon consent to all of Regulation 4, not just the
portion which exempts intercompany transactions.
The term "consolidated return" means any taxable
year for which a consolidated return is made. See Article
2, (b), page 43, Franchise Tax Regulations. It has already been pointed out that the year 1964 was not a
taxable year for Bennett's even though the consolidated
return was made for that year.
In addition, the option to file a consolidated return
must be exercised at the time of filing the return of the

parent. At the time of the filing of the parent's return
in this case, the election was not made to have Bennett's
income included in the return and, therefore, under the
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regulation, it cannot be subsequently included. See Article 10, Regulation 4, page 43, Ibid.
A further reason that the Plaintiff cannot prevail
under the regulation itself is that the term "affiliated
group'' is defined by regulation as not including corporations not subject to tax under the act. See Regulation 4, Article 2 ( b), page 43, Ibid. Bennett's was not
subject to tax under the act for the year 1964 because
it owed no tax on the activities in the year it dissolved
Therefore, it was not a memher of an affiliated group
as defined by the regulations during the year in question.
For these reasons, the exemption is unavailable to
Plaintiff as it and Bennett's were not members of an
affiliated group as defined by the regulation at the time
the liquidating dividend was made.
POINT III
THE COURT SHOULD STRICTLY CONSTRUE THE
CLAIMED EXEMPTION.

This case presents an unusual situation where the
authority purporting to establish a tax exemption is
derived, not from a statute, but from an administrative
regulation. However, the Commission submits that the
general rules regarding the construction of such tax
exemptions apply equally herein. It is well established
in Utah that where a statute purports to create an exemption from the general application of a revenue law,
:mch exemption provision is to be strictly construed
against the one who asserts the claimed exemption. Norville v. State Tax Commission, 98 Utah 170, 97 P.2d 937.
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The presumption is that all exemptions intended
to he granted were granted in express terms and that
language relied upon as creating an exemption must be
clear so as to not admit reasonable controversy about its
meaning. All doubts must be resolved against the exemption, and exemptions will not be aided by judicial
interpretation. Jibdge v. Spencer, 15 Utah 242, 48 Pac.
1097; Pa·rker v. Quinn, 23 Utah 332, 64 Pac. 961; Elks v.
Grosbeck, 40 Utah 1, 120 Pac. 192; Norville v. State Tax
Conunission, 98Utah170, 97 P.2d 937.
Further support for the proposition of strict construction is found in the statute authorizing the commission to promulgate regulations governing consolidated
returns. Sec. 59-13-23 (2) UCA 1953 provides in part
as follows:
"The Tax Commission shall prescribe such regulations as it may deem necessary in order that
the tax liability of an affiliated group of . . .
corporations making a consolidated return . . .
may be determined, computed, assessed, collected
and adjusted in such a manner as clearly to reflect the income and to prevent avoidance of tax
liability.'' (Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, in order to comply with the statutory mandate, the regulations should be interpreted in such a manner as to reflect the income of affiliated corporations
and to prevent the avoidance of tax liability.
The Commission submits that because of the rule
of strict construction an exemption cannot be granted
to the Plaintiff in this matter where the entire regulation setting up an exemption has not been complied with.
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CONCLUSION
\Vhile Regula ti on N" o. + does imrport to exempt
certain intercompany transadions, this exemption, if
valid, cannot be broader than the regulation creating it.
Plaintiff cannot qualify for the exemption because it
made no timely election and because the dividend was
not made during the consolidated return period from a
member of the group affiliated with Plaintiff, all of which
are required by the regulation as well as the statute.
Respectfully submitted,

PHIL L. HANSEN,
Attorney General
F. Burton Howard,
Special Assistant Attorney
General

Attorneys for Defendant

